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DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ATOMIC
POWER DEVELOPMENT
MORGAN THOMAS0
Atomic power is a new source of energy which complements the older power
sources found in coal, oil, and natural gas. Although it involves a technology de-
veloped and held in restricted form by the Government, it is filled with industrial
potential for the national welfare and for the nation's business. Important for these
reasons, it is placed on the battleground where American public policy is formulated.
Both domestic and foreign policy are concerned with progress in making nuclear
power a practical, economic reality. Domestically, it has a great potential effect on the
economic balance of forces. Internationally, it has the characteristic of a much de-
sired body of new knowledge and new techniques which major powers can take to
underdeveloped nations in return for their friendship and support. Hence, atomic
power cuts into the conflict of contending forces at odds over governmental policies.
It catches up the political partisans and gains their artful attention and publicizing.
In short, an open struggle of the American system of democratic control is emerg-
ing, with all the trappings of pressure groups, partisan forces in Congress and the
Executive Branch, and frequent treatment by opinion-leaders, such as commentators,
prominent businessmen, editorial writers, and national news magazines. A lively sub-
ject for "issues" is moving into prominence on the American stage of public policy-
making.
The highly charged political characteristics of atomic power contrast rather sharply
with the general low level of political involvement to which the field of atomic
energy has previously been subjected. Atomic energy policy has been defense policy,
largely formulated in secret within government councils of officials and security-
cleared advisors. From time to time, some questions have spilled out into the
public domain. One was the security policy of the Lilienthal Commission, as
seen in the so-called Hickenlooper inquiry-the investigation of the AEC in z949
by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Another was the decision to go ahead
with an H-bomb "crash" program. However, it was made public only as limited,
after-the-fact information. Some other important decisions, too, were kept com-
pletely hidden from the public when made-e.g., the addition of production reactors
and heavy water manufacturing plants at Savannah River and the establishment
of a new experimental weapons laboratory at Livermore, California. And the
public learned of the decision to enter upon a tremendous expansion of gaseous
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diffusion plants only through the involvement of the congressional appropriations
committees in the summer of 1952. Therefore, on the whole, no active outside
groups took stands, no commentators presented conflicting views, and democratic
control over the Atomic Energy Commission came largely from commission ad-
visers, from members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and, on some issues,
from the President and his immediate staff.
Over all, the defense nature of the program facilitated fairly unanimous resolu-
don of small differences. Occasionally, disputes within the "inner control groups,"
behind the cloak of secrecy, did manifest themselves, but they were not of long
duration. For example, President Eisenhower eliminated the prototype of an aircraft
carrier reactor from the budget estimates in the spring of 1953, but, on the instiga-
tion of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and with the help of the appropria-
tions committees, the item was converted into a large-scale prototype of a central-
station power plant which the AEC was encouraged to start. Thus, policy was
worked out by a governmental control group. It served, to be sure, as an instrument
of public control, but it was not held accountable by the support or opposition of
outside groups or forces. The political representatives who made up the control
group recognized their responsibility to test the atomic energy program by their
own interpretation of what would best serve the nation, but there was no real
democratic check on this interpretation.1
Today, however, atomic power is ushering in a new set of conditions for public
control. As the immediate concern of pressure groups, it enters an area where two
entrenched and bitter opponents, public-power advocates and private-power advo-
cates, fight with all the available political weapons. Furthermore, as the day dawns
when private participation in atomic power begins and chances for private profit
appear on the horizon, forces of self-interest are unleashed. Thus, the different
businesses affected, such as the electric power, chemical engineering, and electric
equipment manufacturing industries, see their rival and complementary positions
in alternative schemes for development of atomic power. The forces of private
initiative bring their inevitable concomitants', those of monopoly and favoritism.
And the individuals and groups in our society who worry about these forces enter
the fray. The Government's vast investment provides a source from which insiders
and especially advantaged firms can benefit at the cost of others. The charge of
"give-away" is heard. The manifestations of democratic political control have come
on the scene.
The emergence of many aspects of democratic public control does not mean, how-
ever, that the technical information necessary for work in the field of atomic power
has been wholly declassified. The reason for this is that the Government's program
of research and development in reactors is a combined military-civilian program.
The same reactor technology applies to the military field as to the civilian. Military
'For a general and more extended discussion of the foregoing, see MORGAN THOMAS, ATOMIC ENERGY
AND CoNGREss (to be published by the University of Michigan Press in March 1956).
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reactors are also producers of atomic power; they are being designed to drive
submarines or surface vessels, to heat gases for jet propulsion in aircraft, and to
provide electric current for portable-package power plants for military installations.
In addition, reactor technology is vital for production reactors in which plutonium
for atomic weapons is produced. Hence, because of the interchangeability of informa-
tion, considerable secrecy of technical features remains.
This fact has several consequences of significance for public control. It means
that outside analysts and public opinion leaders must guess and speculate about cer-
tain features of the various power reactors. The resulting estimates, often conflicting,
cannot be affirmed or denied by government technicians for fear of revealing secret
information. A general impression of confusion and uncertainty prevails. And
although specially designated industrial groups are allowed access to secret technical
information, this participation, no matter how widespread, is no substitute for
general knowledge. Open discussion continues to be restricted, chances for special
advantage obtain, and peaceful atomic power cannot be fitted completely into the
normal system of democratic public control.
Yet, there is more and more publicity about the actual policy decisions which
channel government and private resources into different parts of the reactor pro-
gram. To be sure, the Commission classified its schedule of prices to be paid to
industrial producers of special nuclear materials (plutonium and U-233). However,
it revealed that the prices were based mainly on the "fuel value" of plutonium rather
than the "military value" of the material for weapons use.2 Thus, without stating
these prices in the exact dollar amounts, the Commission did release enough informa-
tion so that the fundamental policy decision is clear: the Government will not give
subsidies to atomic power producers in the form of high guaranteed prices for pro-
duced plutonium.
In short, in spite of the remaining secrecy, general public knowledge and dis-
cussion of atomic power are increasing and will doubtless continue to grow as de-
classification proceeds. As more and more groups become familiar and involved,
the forces of democratic control will enlarge their impact on the field of atomic
power policy. It is with this trend that this paper is concerned-with both the issues
that are evolving and the clashes these issues are occasioning among the various
economic, social, and governmental groups which are affected by the emergence of
nuclear power.
SPEED OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM
The AEC has drawn up a Five-Year Power Reactor Development Program to
guide its own efforts in civilian reactor research and development work. This is
based on the policy that it is the Government's responsibility to develop power
reactor technology "to the point where one or more power reactor systems are
technically and economically feasible, and beyond that, to develop technology for
'See Hearings before the Joint Committee on A4tomic Energy on Development, Growth, and State
of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., ist Sess., pt. I, at 73-76 (1955).
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even more advanced types of power reactors."3 In this program, the Commission
uses mostly government money for planning and building experimental reactors
of moderate size, although it was decided in 1953 to build one large-scale facility,
the pressurized water reactor and power plant now under construction at Shipping-
port, Pennsylvania.
This program requires only brief comment, for it has never been the subject of
controversy. It is true that the National Coal Association publicly deplored the
Government's decision to4
... use huge amounts of taxpayers' money to construct, or to subsidize the construction of,
numerous permanent installations [e.g., the Shippingport reactor] which admittedly will
not be capable of producing electricity at a price which is competitive with coal.
However, even the Coal Association did not take issue with the AEC's five-year
program as a whole, but simply recommended that the Government concentrate on
laboratory research and temporary, pilot-scale experimental plants to obtain knowl-
edge which would render nuclear power useful at a later time.
The lack of opposition to the AEC's civilian reactor program is traceable to the
fact that several groups see value in it for different reasons. Those who favor the
United States' progress in peacetime atomic power for international reasons are en-
couraged. There are practical arguments that the greatest industrial nation on earth
will remain so only if we lead the world in every race for new technological dis-
coveries. Quick achievement of practical atomic power is deemed to be in the
public interest, and there is general agreement that the United States Government
should continue to take the lead in its attainment. Among the economic groups
affected by nuclear power, the electric utilities and equipment manufacturers are
glad to have the Government provide the cost of research and development which
will eventually lead to a technology usable by them. The advocates of public power
are pleased to have atomic power technology remain in government hands so that
their rivals in the private-power field cannot get ahead of them and freeze them out
of the new field. Liberal and labor groups who hope for a government-operated
atomic power system share this view. Finally, the armed services believe that atomic
power reactors for military propulsion are amply provided for and generally favor
the development of civilian power as a complementary program. With such wide
support, the Commission seems likely to move ahead at a rapid pace on its civilian
reactor program.5
UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES: MILITARY V. CIVILIAN
The fact that civilian atomic power had its inception primarily in a military
program brings up the issue of the allocation of resources between military and
'Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Current Statement of the Atomic Energy Commission on the
Five-Year Reactor Development Program, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 1 (1955).
'Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 475-76.
"For a detailed exposition of the attitudes of these various groups towards the AEC's reactor program,
see Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on S. 3323 and H.R. 8862, to Amend the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 83 d Cong., 2d Sess., pts. i and 2 (954).
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civilian uses for atomic power. In general, as already stated, the position of the
military is that civilian applications are not competing with military. Thus, De-
partment of Defense representatives have stated that they strongly support developing
the peacetime uses of atomic energy and broadening the scope of industrial par-
ticipation.0 Although agreement has been reached in principle, this does not mean
that the military interest will not be asserted where a scarcity of resources requires
a choice between military and civilian application. And when a threat to the military
program arises, the military has powerful spokesmen in the Joint Committee on
Atomc Energy, where six of the nine House members serve also on the Committee
on Military Affairs.
One military-civilian conflict arose in early 1955 over President Eisenhower's
proposal for the immediate construction of an atomic-powered merchant ship with
a reactor like that of the Nautilus. Among those elements most active in support
of this proposal were the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee in the House
and the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee in the Senate Arguments
based on the propaganda war with the Soi¢iet Union were brought up, and it was
asserted that unless we acted promptly, the Russians might "beat us to the punch."
Further, AEC Commissioner Libby asserted that the peace ship would not be built
"at the expense of submarines, or the airplane, or any of the military programs."
Admiral Rickover, the Chief of the AEC's Naval Reactor Branch, however, ex-
pressed the view that the merchant ship would result in the delay of the navy
program, and painting a pessimistic picture of any kind of merchant ship program,
he urged, instead, the development of a large ship reactor prototype, which would be
of subsequent use in merchant vessels.8 After considering the question, the Joint
Committee, apparently fearing a drain of resources away from experiments on
military propulsion reactors if the plan were carried out, voted not to authorize the
peace ship.9
What of civilian central-station power reactors? Basically they too are in competi-
tion for resources with military propulsion reactors. Although central-station reactors
are simpler in design than ship propulsion reactors because they do not involve weight
and size limitations and other special features, they use the same materials and are
based on the same technology, which puts them in competition for the limited
number of trained technical personnel. In this case, as with propulsion reactors, the
forces pressing for civilian power are strengthened by the growing importance of
the atom in foreign policy, which tends to suppress the doubts of the military
0 See id., pt. 2, at 733.
'Representative Herbert C. Bonner (D., N.C.) and Senator Warren G. Magnuson (D., Wash.) arc
the respective chairmen of these committees, and they led the fight for authorization of an experimental
atomic-powered merchant ship. See, for example, Senator Magnuson's statement, sos CoNo. Rc.
892o (daily ed. July 13, 1955).
'This discussion of the peace-ship proposal is found in Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Authorizing Legislation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., ist Sees. 78-92, 118-21
(1955).
9 See o CO NG. MEc. 7944-46 (daily ed. June 27, 1955).
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point of view. The cold war must be waged, it is argued, at the same time that
preparations are made for the strongest possible defense in case a hot war should de-
velop.
There remains, then, a clear potential rivalry between the military reactor pro-
gram and both civilian propulsion reactors and central-station power reactors. The
clash of interests results from a competition in the Government's program for pri-
ority to employ the limited number of contractors and technicians capable of doing
this work. Although there appears to be general agreement that a civilian program
is necessary, disputes such as that over the merchant ship may continue to arise as
both the military and civilian programs are pushed rapidly forward.
TE AEC PRODUCTION PROGRAM AND CIVILIAN PowEt
The production of fissionable materials is the prerequisite for work in all phases
of atomic energy. Two roads, both of which have been used by the Government
since 1945, lead to production of these materials. One is the separation process in
which the fissionable isotope, 1-235, is taken out of the stable form, U-238, in a
gaseous diffusion plant. The other is the conversion of a blanket of 1-238 into
fissionable plutonium (Pu-239), or a blanket of thorium (Th-232) into the fissionable
uranium isotope, 1-233. This is done in a converter reactor in which the neutrons
given off in the fission process are used to transmute nonfissionable materials into
fissionable materials, some of which, by a chemical separation process, may then be
extracted for further use.
Much thought has been given to a program which would permit the use of the
heat generated in a production reactor in the latter process for transformation into
power. Thus, a converter or a breeder reactor could produce power as well as
fissionable materials. This possibility, however, poses many problems. Naturally,
the technology to support this "dual-purpose reactor" is much more complicated
than that required to concentrate on materials or power alone. Aside from this
engineering difficulty, there are policy issues to resolve. Should the Government
buy up privately produced fissionable materials at a price guaranteed for a long
period? Without such a guarantee, private industry would be unwilling to build
and operate power reactors which are not economically practical for their power
production alone. Would encouragement to enter into atomic power on this subsi-
dized basis not slow down the attainment of economically practical power? Is the
need for weapons-grade plutonium unlimited; and if not, should the Government
pay the "military value" for plutonium or merely the "fuel value" which it would
have if it were to be used in another reactor?
Although these and related questions have caused considerable debate in hearings
of the Joint Committee, they have, as we have seen, been generally resolved by the
decision that the Government should not encourage public utilities to produce atomic
power by means of guarantees of high prices for the produced fissionable materials.
In this, the United States has parted company with Great Britain. The British
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reactor program has been "largely slanted toward the breeding of other fissionable
fuels, in addition to the production of power."'1
It is not the purpose of this article to set forth the arguments on both sides of this
issue. Both appear to have solid reasoning behind them. The pertinent question
is: how has public control operated so that those who opposed long-term subsidized
plutonium prices have carried the day?
The opening of the policy debate can be attributed to a speech by Charles A.
Thomas, President of Monsanto Chemical Company, on June ii, i95o." His pro-
posal was for industry to own and operate a duel-purpose reactor, with the Govern-
ment making it attractive by giving participating companies long-term contracts to
purchase plutonium and by-products so that their capital could be amortized. This
was followed by a similar recommendation from former AEC Chairman David E.
Lilienthal, who took the same position in a Collier's article in July 1950.12 Out of
this ferment came the proposal of the Detroit Edison Company and the Dow Chem-
ical Company to be permitted to undertake a study of stationary nuclear reactors.'3
And in January 1951, the AEC announced its Industrial Participation Study Pro-
gram, in which private business could be cleared to investigate atomic power tech-
nology.' 4
During 1952, the Commission continued to arouse interest in industrial participa-
tion, and the dual-purpose reactor was mentioned frequently as a fitting incentive.
Meanwhile, however, the Commission's own reactor development program was pro-
ceeding apace, its technological knowledge was growing, and it was following a
program of expansion of its facilities for production of fissionable materials, the
biggest increase in which was to be reflected in the appropriations bill in the sum-
mer of 1952. This expansion program, it was determined, was to be for materials
production only, and, in a sense, this policy decision partly foreclosed a combined
power and production program that might have been adopted instead.
Industry, however, continued to consider variations on the dual-purpose theme.
In the fall of 1952, Walker Cisler, President of Detroit Edison, articulated the view
of one prominent utility group in a speech before the National Industrial Confer-
ence Board.' 5 He did not feel that it was necessary to establish a price for the atomic
by-products as an incentive for private capital to build and operate commercial-sized
nuclear power plants. Nor did he think that a market for the materials would be
lacking. And the proposal submitted subsequently by the Dow-Detroit Edison
group included selling plutonium to the Government but also stressed that such
material had a prospective market for reactors to propel ships, submarines, and air-
craft.
10 Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 6766,
Public Works Appropriations, z956, 84th Cong., ist Sess. x5 (x955).
" The pertinent portions of this address and the text of the Monsanto proposal are reprinted in Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Atomic Power and Private Enterprise, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 277-80 (t952).
"
5 See id. at 285-91. "See id. at 296-97.
1 See id. at 297-301. " See id. at 365-70.
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At the same time, inside the Commission, a dearer policy line seemed to be
taking shape on the dual-purpose reactor. It was that the Government could not
afford to guarantee a plutonium market to builders of industrial reactors. The AEC
saw the problems incorporated in the question of whom to let into the guaranteed
and subsidized price program and whom to leave out. The long-term guarantee
of prices for materials produced in what would probably be obsolescent plants also
gave them reason to hesitate to make such commitments.-6
Against this background, in the fall of 1952, the Joint Committee staff members
undertook a general survey of the thinking of business and scientific communities
regarding atomic power.' 7 It became evident that there was a divergence of view-
point among the three chiefly-concerned businesses. Electric utilities were deter-
mined to enter more boldly into atomic power than they had done in the case of
hydro-electric power, but they were not eager to be tied to a government market.
Equipment manufacturers, like General Electric, Westinghouse, and Allis-Chalmers,
were interested in the rapid development of power reactors by any route, whether
subsidized by government purchase of fissionable materials or not. They saw in
atomic energy a potential low-cost fuel to keep power costs low and power consump-
tion rising. Lastly, chemical companies proved to be more interested in manufac-
turing fissionable materials and in developing extensive uses of fission products than
they were in atomic power per se.
Further, at the hearings called by the Joint Committee in 1953, the concensus of
the witnesses was that the difficulties in designing economically practical power
plants were largely technical. Consequently, there was a strong incentive to con-
centrate on "power-only" reactors in order to simplify the technology. A general
"shying away" from subsidy in the form of high plutonium prices was noticeable.'
Nevertheless, in the 1954 hearings on the new act, the AEC still gave evidence
of wanting to keep all approaches open.'0 Its statements purposely kept the possi-
bility of high prices for plutonium in the picture, but no commitments to a definite
policy were made. Representatives Holifield and Price, however, saw in the combi-
nation of government ownership of special nuclear materials and a provision for a
40-year production facility license the likelihood of hidden subsidies to dual-purpose
reactor operators. Although they persuaded the Joint Committee to limit any
guaranteed fair price to seven years, they saw in the AEC's discretion to set these
prices the possibility of subsidies of undetermined magnitude ° Labor union repre-
"oOn the AEC's thinking at this time, see an address by Commissioner Zuckert, delivered before
the Chicago Section of the American Chemical Society, AEC Release, Sept. 1I, 1952. The Com-
missioner posed some of the difficult problems involved in the dual-purpose approach and suggested
that "power-only" reactors might possibly be the solution.
" See Atomic Power and Private Enterprise, supra note ii, at 33-56.
" See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Summary of the Hearing before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, 83d Cong., ist Sess. 4-9 (1953)-
10 See Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 570-7r.
0
' See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Report to accompany H.R. 9757, Amending the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, as amended, and for Other Purposes, H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
130-31 (1954).
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sentatives, desiring government ownership of reactors, were also opposed to subsidiz-
ing private reactors by high prices for their production of fissionable materials.21
The utilities, too, were decidedly cautious concerning the pricing section. Walker
Cisler, of Detroit Edison, repeated his preference to have the utilities free to dispose
of the material as they wished rather than be tied to a government market.22 And
others pointed out the danger of retarding the reactor program as a result of the
Commission's reluctance to license reactors because it would thereby incur large
obligations to purchase special nuclear material. Only General Electric and the
private laboratories felt that purchase by the Government was desirable and sug-
gested that the AEC should contract for special nuclear materials at firm prices and
thus provide a strong incentive for private investment in dual-purpose reactors.24
The passage of the act left the Commission free to decide the issue. Its secret
price lists were announced in January 1955. As later interpreted, these were based on
a policy of a "power-only" reactor, since the by-product fissionable material was to
be priced, in the long run, as reactor fuel rather than for weapons purposes. AEC
spokesmen have explained the decision as based on (I) technical contradictions and
(2) the problem of fitting together power supply and plutonium supplyY5 The Com-
mission had decided that the dual-purpose route simply was not one which by itself
would lead to economic atomic power. If the AEC had "up its sleeve" a 2oth century
Homestead Act to encourage pioneering in nuclear power plants, at least it was not
going to exercise its prerogatives by means of high prices for fissionable materials.
As a result of this policy, it was not possible for private investment alone to
finance and construct atomic reactors, supported by high prices to be paid by the
Government for materials produced. Instead, a period of joint undertakings be-
came necessary, a period of cooperative government-industry work toward achieving
competitive "power-only" plants.
THE INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENT AND BusIN.ss
When the Government carries out a program of power reactor research and de-
velopment by means of contracts, the question of the extent of the government effort
is resolved in terms of appropriations. But when a jointly financed undertaking is
planned, the problem of how-and where-to draw the line between government
aid and business expense becomes a complicated policy issue.
The rationale of government aid is important. It is justified because of private
contributions to national defense. Rapid tax amortization and direct government
financing at low interest rates are cases in point. The Duquesne Light Company
has applied for this aid for its power plant being built at Shippingport, Pennsylvania,
21 See Hearings, supra note 5, pt. i, at 486-514 (r954).
2 See id. at 76-77.
" See id. at 377-98.
"' See id. at 349, 428.
2 For a discussion of AEC thinking on this matter, see Power Reactor Development in the
United States, an address delivered before the Canadian Electrical Association by W. Kenneth Davis,
Director, Division of Reactor Development, AEC Release, June 29, 1955.
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in connection with the AEC's pressurized water reactor26 Government aid is also
justified as paying for knowledge which will generally advance a technological art
in the public interest. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics operates
on this rationale, and the AEC's reactor demonstration program has the same basing.
What forms should AEC aid take? The Commission has announced its policy:
not to "hide a large part of this [aid] in the price paid for materials which will be
produced by these reactors" but rather "to bring it out in the open where it is a
clear-cut research and development assistance."" This thus rules out the possibility
of setting the secret prices for privately produced fissionable materials much higher
than the materials really cost to produce. In addition, the AEC announced that
it would charge private firms for materials "burned-up" or lost, and that it would
charge the full costs of fuel fabrication and chemical processing, two services to be
performed for industry by the Government.
28
The AEC did, however, make available three types of aid:29
* . . waiver of the charge that the licensee would otherwise have to pay for the use of
special nuclear material furnished by AEC; performance in AEC laboratories and test
facilities without charge to licensees of certain mutually agreed upon research and develop-
ment work; and financial assistance under appropriate research and development contracts.
This assistance could be arranged to suit the private firm's need in each undertaking
approved under the AEC's Power Reactor Demonstration Program, in which the
Commission asked for industry proposals on constructing power reactors under license
and indicated that those receiving the least amount of government aid would have a
greater chance of acceptance. Clearly, this aid was to be tailored to the need of each
reactor project. The AEC, as we have seen, has described it as "clearcut research and
development assistance." Provided the dollar equivalents of the services made avail-
able by the AEC to each project are made known, this aid will be open and not
hidden. Yet, because it will differ in each case, it will be hard to explain why a
greater private share could not have been bargained out in each case.
The policy of giving this form of aid is by no means a settled one. There was
controversy over the decision to tie in research and development contracts with
licenses to construct and operate civilian power plants. In fact, some doubt is cast
on the legality of this scheme by the 1954 act's section i69, which prohibits funds
from being employed in the construction or operation of licensed facilities except
under research and development contracts or agreements.30 Representative Cole took
issue with the AEC; he interpreted the provision-in keeping with the legislative
history, he said-to allow the Commission to pay for research work only after
20 See Hearings, supra note 2, pt. i, at 9o-IO.
'
T id. at 169.
"See id. at 74-75, 18o.
19d. at X52.
"The text of this section is as follows: "No funds of the Commission shall be employed in the
construction or operation of facilities licensed under section 103 or 104, except under contract or other
arrangement entered into pursuant to section 31. . " 68 STAT. 952, 42 U.S.C.A. §2209 (Supp. 1954).
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private facilities were built. Senator Anderson also exhibited uneasiness about this
kind of aid or subsidy. However, other Joint Committee members defended the
AEC's judgment in proposing the scheme.3 1
Later, at the hearings in May 1955, Representative Holifield and Joint Committee
Staff Member Walter Hamilton developed the interpretation that judgment must
be made, in each case, whether the research assistance results in greater benefit
to the technological art or to the individual company. At this hearing, the AEC
offered its solution to the problem-interpreting section i69 to prevent the Govern-
ment from giving away title to any part of a reactor (bricks or mortar) built by the
Government as research assistance3 2
Aside from this issue of legality, Representative Durham was not satisfied with the
idea of a different amount of government aid in each case. Recognizing that
favoritism and special treatment for different industrial firms or regions of the
country must be avoided if possible, he desired a formula from which to derive the
amount of money the federal government would put up for each project combining
business and federal funds. His idea was to have a fixed percentage-say 25 per cent
-so that a firm in one region would get the same treatment as one in another. But
the AEC immediately pointed out the impossibility of this by citing the example
of the need for a demonstraton homogeneous reactor. Since no industry proposal
for one had been made, the Government had to be free to arrange a higher contribu-
tion to induce some firm to contribute some of its own money 3
A related problem arises out of the fact that the introduction of private money
into reactor work may become such a goal in itself that it may be furthered at the
cost of the government program. For example, the House Appropriations Commit-
teemen, in July 1955, eliminated money for the Power Reactor Acceleration Pro-
gram. They did so because the program was not spelled out in the justifications, but
they could easily have taken up the argument that the public money should be shut
off in order to encourage more private money to be invested. Specifically, Repre-
sentative Holifield cautioned the AEC against warping the program just because it
wanted to get a private firm to operate the Engineering Test Reactor. He coun-
seled: "... do not worship the fetish of getting outside money in, to the point where
"134you do it at the long-term detriment of the Government....
All in all, the dividing line is not clear-cut, and charges of "give-away" haunt
anyone who embarks on one of these combined programs. The lag in announcing
arrangements under the Power Demonstration Reactor Program was probably due
in part to complications of this nature. Understandably, the Commission was care-
ful about entering into commitments of this kind as the present transitional period
"For this debate, see Hearings, supra note 2, pt. i, at 154-79.
"2 See Hearings, supra note 8, at 49-57. This AEC formula was subsequently adopted. See The
Power Demonstration Reactor Program, remarks prepared by Louis H. Roddis, Jr., Deputy Director, Di-
vision of Reactor Development, AEC Release, Sept. 27, 1955.
"See Hearings, supra note 8, at 13-14.
"Id. at io6.
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involves it in a crossfire of views on the amount and kinds of government aid which
it should dispense. The voices are rising from every quarter of the domestic scene.
The announcements by the Russians at Geneva that they have found economically
practical atomic power will increase the clamor for rapid development and govern-
ment aid. At the same time, the voices of caution and restraint against pampering
American industry will not be silenced. The AEC will find its decisions becoming
progressively more subject to the conflicting influences of public opinion.
QUICK DEVELOPMENT BY "INSIDERS" AND POTENTIAL MONOPOLISTS
V. CONTROLLED AND EQUAL AccEss
The incipient atomic power industry consists in part of equipment manufacturers
who will be in the business of building and selling reactors and components. Sev-
eral giant firms, such as General Electric, Westinghouse, and Allis-Chalmers, lead
the field. These companies have been principal contractors and subcontractors of
the AEC, chosen because they have been judged to possess the industrial capacity
to provide the best management for AEC facilities. As a result, they are at great ad-
vantage over other companies. They have acquired technically trained staffs and
valuable experience in solving reactor problems.
The economic organization of American industry is, thus, brought into the pic-
ture. A question arises: should the results of government research and development
be exploited by the small group of large industrial firms, or should the benefits of
government discovery be widely distributed? Put in these terms, an affirmative
answer to the latter question becomes the rallying cry of liberals.
A conflict of objectives of public policy is involved here. A quick exploitation
by private enterprise would be achieved by letting the competitive position of these
firms determine the outcome of their economic rivalry. Yet, a public policy of
distributing the benefits of the new technology broadly would require a positive gov-
ernmental program to aid other firms to move into the business and, at the same time,
to restrain those with a "head-start." The AEC has attempted to expand the group
of knowledgeable firms. The study agreement program was for that purpose. The
hiring of new contractors for the AEC's five-year power reactor program, such as
North American Aviation, has had the same end. The letting of the contract to
Westinghouse for the 6o,ooo kilowatt pressurized water reactor power plant ignored
this policy, but the AEC explained that very few companies were able to do this
job at all because of insufficient access to technical knowledgeY5 And the invitations
for bids on the power-package reactor provided another opportunity to bring new
firms into the atomic power business.
On what basis to make the awards has created a problem. If the bids which are
most economical for the Government are accepted, these are likely to come from
" Similarly, Westinghouse and General Electric held all contracts in the naval reactor development
program until a contract for a small submarine reactor was awarded to Combustion Engineering, Inc., in
August 1955. See AEC Release No. 677, Aug. 11, 1955.
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the firms with the most experience, money, and assets-and the policy of distributing
widely the know-how developed by tax dollars will be thwarted. On the other
hand, if bids from inexperienced companies are accepted, no firm assurance of their
competency to do the work efficiently is present, especially since they will probably
not be able to outbid the experienced firms for the few technicians available. Hence,
without an aggressive governmental policy to spread the benefits at the cost of quick
private development, the large equipment manufacturers have a good chance of
gaining a great share of the new market.
The issue of market leadership also involves the matter of patents, for it has
been the patented processes which held the market for the two or three big concerns
in electric generating equipment. At the hearings on amending the Atomic Energy
Act, business interests presented a solid front for firmer patent rights in inventions."0
Opposed, however, was an underlying fear in Congress lest the advantage now held
by a few companies already engaged in atomic energy work (principally AEC con-
tractors) would give these companies an unfair advantage over competitors, and even
a dominant position and accompanying monopoly. As a result, provisions to prevent
insiders from converting their advantage into a monopoly were written into the
bill. One was the so-called compulsory patent licensing (operable until September
I, 1959), by which the AEC, after satisfying a great array of conditions, can require
a patent holder to license another firm.T The other was a provision which gives
the AEC title to any invention conceived in the course of any contract, arrangement,
or relationship with the AEC, regardless of whether funds of the AEC are involved,
although the Commission has the power to waive such claim 38 Thus, as long as
the AEC continues a tight policy on releasing inventions for private firms to patent,
the threat of advantaging "insiders" appears to have been defeated. Pressures will,
of course, be directed at the AEC, in whose discretion the patent policy now falls, but
the threat of a charge of "give-away" hangs over the Commission's head and serves
as an impediment to sweeping waivers of any kind.
The chemical firms were also much concerned that patents be allowable in atomic
energy work. However, since the AEC has followed a policy to the effect that all
chemical processing will be done for some time by the Government under contract,
the chances for these firms to be in a position to obtain patents is remote.
Because of the general congressional concern lest monopoly find a suitable breed-
ing ground in atomic energy, no special dispensations with respect to the operation
of the federal antitrust machinery were inserted in the 1954 act-in fact, it is explicitly
stated that the antitrust laws are applicable to all licensees. Furthermore, the AEC
must report promptly to the Attorney General any conditions which appear to tend
36 See Hearings, supra note 5, Pt. x, especially the testimony of Babcock and Wilcox Co., at 92, Dow
Chemical Co., at 104, and General Electric Co., at 334.
3 §r53. 68 STA. 945, 42 U.S.C.A. §2183 (Supp. 1954)-
s §152. 68 STAT. 944, 42 U.S.C.A. §2182 (Supp. 1954). These and cognate patent problems are
discussed more fully in another article in this symposium. See Boskey, Some Patent Aspects of Atomic
Power Development, inlra, 1'3-31.
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toward the violation of these laws. And before a competitive license can be issued,
the Attorney General is to advise the AEC publicly whether the proposed license
tends to "maintain or create a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. '39
The risk-dividing way to share the burden of development in this new field,
however, is by means of groups of companies. Study groups are on this basis, and
presumably power reactors will be feasible for several power companies banded to-
gether. Accordingly, conflicts with the Public Utility Holding Company Act and
the antitrust acts may possibly arise. To obviate any difficulty in this connection,
therefore, the Detroit Edison group has formed a nonprofit corporation for its
proposal to build an experimental prototype of a breeder reactor.40
In addition to the combination of public utilities alone, there was also the distinct
possibility of a vertical industral organization, a type of combination which had
encountered difficulty with the antitrust laws in the past. By this means, a single
business could produce power in a dual-purpose reactor, chemically separate fission-
able materials from the reactor core, and convert the by-product materials to chem-
ical uses of various kinds. The Dow Chemical Company in the Detroit Edison
group offered the opportunity for such a vertical combination. However, when the
AEC's policy of not underwriting high-priced plutonium production and of not re-
linquishing chemical processing to private enterprise became apparent, the Dow
Chemical Company withdrew from this group 1
Regardless of its legality under existing law, affiliation of private power com-
panies is feared as monopoly in many quarters. These combinations are con-
sidered to be a threat by those who believe in public power and its yardstick as the
only effective form of competition in the electric power industry. This viewpoint
was strongly expressed in the Interim Report on hearings on monopoly in the power
industry, held in 1953 and 1954 by Senator Langer's Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly Legislation. The Subcommittee expressed the gravest concern over
a new "surge of monopoly" in the power industry. It found, first, "that there is a
two-pronged drive by private monopoly to destroy public competition in the power
business"; and second, "that Wall Street domination of the power industry has
revived many of the holding company evils which Congress sought by legislation
to suppress, particularly the extension of monopoly control over very wide regions."'
The pattern of abuse by private utilities, said the Subcommittee,
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... indicates the difficulties, and often impossibilities, of effective State regulation.... The
hearings further developed alarming evidences of the failure of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act to accomplish its purpose, e.g., to protect the public against the domination
of operating companies by holding companies, excessive service charges, and all the
monopolistic devices which tend to increase rates and restrict service.
" §io5. 68 STAT. 938, 42 U.S.C.A. §2135 (Supp. 1954).
"0 See Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 236-37, 252-53.
41 See id. at 243.
"Senate Committee on the judidary, Interim Report, Monopoly in the Power Industry, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 ('954)-
"I ld. at 7.
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The Subcommittee indicated its view that the Republican administration had aided
this dangerous trend toward the destruction of competition by a repudiation of the
all-important "antimonopoly instrument of democracy," the yardstick.
Much of this desire to prevent monopoly of any kind in the atomic power in-
dustry rallied around an insistence upon retaining section 7 (b) of the McMahon
Act.44 Briefly, this provision required the Commission to report to the President
if and when it believed any industrial, commercial, or other nonmilitary use of
fissionable material had been sufficiently developed to be of practical value. In the
report, the Commission had to estimate the economic, political, and social ramifica-
tions of such developments. The President then submitted it and his own recom-
mendations to Congress. Until ninety days had elapsed, no license could be issued.
This procedure was taken as insurance that the atomic industry could not be born
to monopoly without a full open dicussion under the winds of public opinion. Labor
unions supported this view, and found another reason for such a report in the danger
of technological replacement of workers in the coal and oil industries.4" Con-
trariwise, advocates of quick assumption of responsibility by private enterprise were
unalterably opposed to the section 7(b) report. David E. Lilienthal sharply criticized
the report as applying a brake on progress, because all groups opposed to the growth
of an atomic energy industry could unite in lobbying Congress to stall the industrial
development of civilian atomic power.40 In various stages of the 1954 act, the pro-
vision was successively weakened until it required merely a finding in writing by the
Commission alone before it could issue competitive commercial licenses under section
IO3.7 As these will not be feasible for some time, the report is of small significance
at present. Meanwhile, however, by means of the gradual private assumption of
responsibility, aided by AEC research and development contracts, the framework of
the atomic power industry in great measure will have taken shape before issuance of
the requisite "finding of practical value."
Still another aspect of the competitive position of industry involves public policy.
Business firms working for the Commission could attempt to exert influence in be-
half of policies designed to improve their relative standing vis-a'-vis their competitors.
The joint Committee recently has evinced a suspicion of this. Concerning General
Electric's recommendation of a high pressure water design for the submarine
advanced reactor, it raised the question whether the company urged this type so as
to catch up with Westinghouse, which had had all previous experience in this field."8
"6o STAT. 764, 42 U.S.C. §18o7(b) (1946).
"'Mr. Andrew J. Biemiller, member of the National Legislative Committee, AFL, advocated rc-
tention of the §7(b) report in the hearings on the amendment of the 1946 act in May 1954. See
Hearings, supra note 5, pt. i, at 271. And at the first hearings subsequent to the passage of the new
act, he reiterated this suggestion. See Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 325, 327. See also the letter
from Anthony Matz, International President of the International Brotherhood of Fireman and Oilers, id.,
pt. 3, at 588.
" See note r2 supra.
4' §xo2. 68 STAT. 936, 42 U.S.C.A. §2132 (Supp. 1954).
"See Hearings, supra note 8, at 68-69.
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Concern over the likelihood of creating a monopoly in the atomic energy industry
is pronounced in the speeches and testimony of labor and public-power advocates.
Several of the liberal Congressmen have joined them. On the whole, however, these
pressures have not been strong enough to instigate precautionary measures of any
consequence for the AEC.
REGIONAL INTERESTS v. ECONOMIC PROGRESS
The prospects of atomic power have excited regional interests. The coal-mining
areas have been represented by the National Coal Association and the miners' unions.
The Coal Association urged that if government subsidization of the construction or
operation of full-scale permanent nuclear power plants were deemed necessary, these
facilities should be built outside of coal's normal market areas. The coal industry,
its spokesman said, feels it is entitled to ask that taxpayers' money not be used to
subsidize its competition. The unions held that the exploitation of nuclear power
should be done by the Government for the high-cost power areas. Congressmen
from Pennsylvania have reportedly questioned the location of the PWR in that
state.
49
On the other hand, high-cost power areas asked for government-generated
nuclear power. A proposal from Nevada interests for nuclear power for mining and
irrigation was put forward.5" But since the prevailing policy was to turn to private
business to finance in great part the full-scale prototypes of nuclear power plants, this
proposal fell on barren ground. In Minnesota, likewise, political pressure arose for
government help for a rural electric atomic power plant.51 However, the REA, in a
Republican administration committed to curtail expansion of public power, was
not in a position to be very active in such gathering pressure. It is questionable
whether sufficient momentum can be gained in these areas to enlist a disinterested
AEC in helping work out the technical and financial details of such projects. The
easiest course is to rely on the large utility groups, which, because they are technically
experienced and financially backed, can carry forward reactor projects with the mini-
mum of guidance from the AEC.
These groups are headed by the large power companies of several metropolitan
areas. Consolidated Edison of New York was first to make a straight noncom-
petitive license application; Detroit Edison and Commonwealth Edison of Chicago
were the first to gain AEC acceptance of their proposals under the Power Demon-
stration Reactor Program.52 Clearly, the large cities are going to have atomic power
"The point of view of the coal-mining regions was expressed to the Joint Committee by spokesmen
for the National Coal Association. See Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 475-87.
" See Atomic Power and Private Enterprise, supra note ii, at 23-24.
" The proposal for such a plant is reported in N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1955, p. 8, col. 2.
"' See AEC Authorizes Action Toward New Nuclear Power Reactors, AEC Release No. 674, Aug. 8,
1955. Although the Commonwealth Edison group was apparently responding to the AEC's Demonstra-
tion Reactor Program, it matched Consolidated Edison in proposing to bear the total cost of its nuclear
plant, as the New York utility had done. Similarly, Commonwealth Edison requested a licensing ar-
rangement for its plant.
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first, although the policy intent of the 1954 act appeared to favor the high-cost power
areas.
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PRIVATE PowER V. PUBLIC PowE
The prospect of a major new source of electric energy has set the forces of private
power jockeying for position against the forces of public power. In the background
of this rivalry over the atom is the history of hydro-electric power generation. The
possibility of harnessing falling water to produce power was neglected by private
power groups, with the result that the federal government moved in to construct
dams and central-station generating plants. The power generated was given on a
preferred basis to public corporations, which distributed it in cities and rural power
districts. The federal government also encouraged these public bodies by loans to
build up their distribution systems. In addition, federal power policy incorporated
the idea of preference for public bodies in securing licenses for hydro-electric genera-
tion in case the federal government itself did not use the falling water.
The concept of water in streams as a natural resource of the federal government,
to be used for the citizens of the area without including a profit for the shareholders
of a private corporation, thus, became the creed of the liberal thought of the Western
states. Federal sale of hydro-electric power at rates below those charged by the
private companies of the area became another rallying cry. Known as the "yard-
stick" device, it was looked upon as the only effective way of preventing private
power companies from taking advantage of the natural situation of one distributor
for one geographic area. It was alleged that state regulatory commissions were
largely ineffective in bringing down electric rates consistent with technological im-
provements in power production. 4
As it became obvious that the future would see practical atomic power, the pri-
vate power companies determined that they would not be "caught napping" as they
had been in the development of hydro-electric power. They recognized that the
climate of opinion was running against public power for the first time since the
advent of the New Deal, and they saw a chance to keep the federal government out
of nuclear power generation. They had added incentive, in that they faced a future
in which conventional sources of power were becoming exhausted or excessively
costly. This prospect lent a note of urgency to the development of practical atomic
power.
As a result, private power has not waited for completely competitive nuclear
power before spending its own money. Because large sums were required for re-
search and development and for capitalization of future power plants, private power
companies formed associations to share costs and applied for study agreements with
the AEC. In this way, they could familiarize their technicians with reactor tech-
"
3The intent was stated specifically with respect to commercial licenses granted under §103.
See §182(c), 68 STAT. 954, 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(C) (Supp. 1954).
5"For a concise treatment of the evolution of government power policies, see King, Power Policy, in
2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 465, especially 469-76 (1953).
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nology and acquire the knowledge needed for the next stage, i.e., actual work on
developmental projects. Two groups, the Pacific Northwest Power Group and the
Rocky Mountain Nuclear Power Study Group, were organized by the private power
companies in areas of the West which had been thoroughly invaded by public power.
In addition to this study group activity, the biggest private utilities in the large
urban areas seem to be eager to participate actively in building full-scale prototype
nuclear plants, as indicated by their proposals under the Power Demonstration
Reactor Program.
To public-power advocates, private development of atomic power is unfortunate.
In reference to the formation of the Rocky Mountain study group of private power
companies, Senator Anderson of the Joint Committee suggested the public-power
viewpoint when he said:"
The announcement that Electric Bond and Share would be the principal genius in trying
to bring nuclear power to the Rocky Mountain States puts a cold shiver down the back of
any person who is hopeful that we may get development in that part of the world.
Those who advocate public power realize that a continuation of the AEC in
the civilian power area would be the best guarantee against private power pre-
empting the field. They favor a kind of section 7(b) report on which open political
forces can play in their behalf. They hope that a new "atomic TVA" can be formed
to produce nuclear power and provide a governmental yardstick. Speaking chiefly
through Representative Holifield on the Joint Committee, the public-power group
sees a governmental obligation to distribute the benefits of federal research to help
in reducing consumers' rates-a result which, it is alleged, will not occur if private
power companies are allowed to pre-empt the new field.56 The group fears that
private utilities will develop atomic power in low-cost areas and require rate-payers
there to pay for the costs of development. On the other hand, the argument runs,
if the Government conducts the development in high-cost areas, the lessons learned
there can be used for all.
The public-power bodies, however, are definitely at a disadvantage to the private
companies in research and development. Most of them are small, because they came
into being to fill in the areas not covered by the big private utilities. They are de-
pendent on local approval for investment in experimental work. Because of their
small capitalization, it is difficult for them to perform research and development
work. This latter problem came up at the hearings on the confirmation of Dr.
Libby as Atomic Energy Commissioner. The National Rural Electric Cooperative
Association, using Senator Anderson as its spokesman during the hearings, asked
Dr. Libby: "Do you feel the chief criterion of cooperation between AEC and these
public groups should be the amount of money that a group can put up?" 7 Dr.
"'Hearings before the Senate Section of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Confirmation
of AEC Commissioners, June 1953 to March x955, 84 th Cong., ast Sess. 17 (1955).
"The approach taken by Mr. Holifield is illustrated by two lengthy statements which he made on
the floor of the House of Representatives. 1on CONG. REC. 2437-40, 5598-6oo (954).
1 See Hearings, supra note 55, at 17.
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Libby replied that it was the competence of engineering staff which should govern,
but he neglected to note that money can buy this talent. All in all, his reply hardly
refuted those who argue that the public groups are, in fact, handicapped in their
limited ability to obtain capital.
Still, public power is making a determined effort in the development of atomic
energy, although it does not and probably cannot display the aggressiveness shown
by the private companies. By mid-i955, four public bodies had entered into study
agreements with the AEC: the TVA, the Seminole Electric Cooperative of Florida
(a federation of five distributing cooperatives), the Consumers Public Power Dis-
trict of Nebraska, and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. Two
proposals had been made for building medium or large-scale power plants. One
proposal, from the Consumers Public Power District of Nebraska, came under the
AEC's Power Demonstration Reactor Program. The other was a proposal from the
Rural Cooperative Power Association of Elk River, Minnesota, to build a 22,000
kilowatt nuclear plant.5
These interests are aided by considerable public-power sentiment in Congress,
though there is little in the AEC and the rest of the Executive Branch, as revealed
by the Dixon-Yates controversy. When the new organic law for atomic energy was
being written, the public-power advocates took advantage of their congressional sup-
port to insert clauses designed in their favor. The bill, as written by Representative
Cole and Senator Hickenlooper, generally protected private business against public-
power corporations. It prevented the AEC from becoming a power producer except
incidentally as a result of experimental research and development facilities. And
although the bill was amended on the floor of the Senate to authorize the AEC or
other federal agencies to generate power commercially and to market it through
the Secretary 6f the Interior under the Flood Control Act of 1944, which gives
preference to public bodies and cooperatives, this provision was defeated in confer-
ence.
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The first of two preference clauses was put into the act in section 44.00 This gives
to public bodies and cooperatives preference in purchasing experimental and by-
product power from the AEC. The by-product power provision would be important
only in case the Government should build large-scale dual-purpose reactors. The
preference on experimental power has required the AEC to offer the power from
the land-based prototype of the submarine intermediate reactor at West Milton, New
York, to three public power bodies within a reasonable transmission radius.0 '
"The AEC rejected the Nebraska proposal in its August 8 release, supra note 52, but subsequently
approved a revised version as a basis for negotiation. See AEC Authorizes Reactor Power Plant Ne-
gotiations .with Nebraska Power Group, AEC Release No. 723, Oct. 27, 1955. The Minnesota proposal
had not then been acted upon.
" The text of the provision-the so-called Johnson amendment-is printed in too CoNG. Rre. x221
(1954). For the debate, see id. at 11221-37, IX319-88.
"0 68 STAT. 929, 42 U.S.C.A. §2064 (Supp. 1954).
"' See AEC Announces Plans for First Sale of Atomic-Electric Power, AEC Release No. 663, July 13,
1955.
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Another preference clause involved the granting of commercial licenses to operate
production or utilization facilities. In the bill, as reported out of committee, prefer-
ence was to be given only to high-cost power areas in the United States. It was
amended however, to include public bodies and cooperatives. And to assure that
preference agencies and others will get a full opportunity to be heard on any interest
they may have, the law requires that regulatory agencies and public and private
utilities within transmission distance of a proposed reactor shall all receive notice
before applications for commercial licenses are acted on0 There is some doubt,
however, about how useful this preference cladse will be to the public-power groups,
because they will not have the capital to put up when commercial licenses become
feasible. Hence, one might expect them to prefer to have the federal government
produce the power and wholesale it to them 3
Public and private-power groups are deeply entrenched in the fabric of American
economic life. Their running and indecisive battle is destined to continue in-
definitely. Atomic power, armed with the importance of its military and inter-
national aspect, will enter one of the most active battlefields of American politics.
All concerned with it will find themselves involved in the struggle.
SECRECY AND THERMONUCLEAR PowER
Atomic power from nuclear fission, we have seen, is becoming more widely
understood and discussed. It is increasingly subject to most of the forces of demo-
cratic control. Atomic power from thermonuclear energy, however, was almost
wholly hidden behind the barrier of secrecy until August 1955. At that time, Chair-
man Strauss, of the AEC, admitted to reporters in Geneva that the United States
had been working on the subject for a considerable time. He said that scientific
progress was being made, but that no real break-through had occurred. This was
the first announcement made to the American people about a program that may turn
out to have enormous importance.64
In the period preceding the Geneva conference, certain stirrings over the possi-
bility of fusion power were noticeable, particularly from persons connected with the
Joint Committee. The former counsel of the Committee, John S. Walker, wrote an
article in which he stressed the potentialities of thermonuclear power and urged
that a concentrated effort to achieve it should be made by the AEC, in a new lab-
" See §§182(b), (c). 68 STAT. 954, 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(b), (c) (Supp. 1954)-
"' On the comparatively unfavorable financial situation of the public power systems, see Hearings,
supra note 2, pt. 2, at 412-13. Appended to the main issue over public versus private power is the
question of who will pay for the costs of development by private power companies. The ratepayers and
the stockholders are involved. How the burden will be shared-and how the expenses will be recouped-
is a complicated subject beyond the scope of this paper. It partly depends on the rulings of state regu-
latory commissions in allowing developmental expenses as part of the deductible expenses in rate-making.
For a more extended discussion of the problems of public power in an atomic context, see Marks,
Public Power and Atomic Power Development, infra, 132-47.
a' Chairman Strauss's revelations were made at a press conference held by the United States Dele-
gation to the International Conference for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, at Geneva, Switzerland, on
August 11, 1955. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1955, p. I, col. I.
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oratory divorced from nuclear weapons work. 5  Chairman Anderson, of the Joint
Committee, in a speech delivered shortly before the Geneva conference opened,
made reference to the possibility of fusion power, and asked the dramatic question:
"Will we be able to tell the world, at Geneva, whether we are trying our hardest to
find out whether [the production of thermonuclear power] can be mastered ?"00
The Joint Committee has always been among those most eager to see the greatest
possible development of the military uses of thermonuclear energy, and Senator
Anderson's remarks, together with prior references by other members, suggested that
the Committee's stress on fusion carry over into the peacetime field. This was
borne out by later statements from three Committee members, Senator Anderson
and Representatives Price and Hinshaw, upon their return from Geneva. The three
legislators suggested that the United States was "fumbling" in its program for
fusion power, and revealed that the Committee had repeatedly urged the Com-
mission to "put forth the maximum possible effort" in this significant area.OT
The AEC, however, has taken a limited approach to fusion power. Chairman
Strauss said enough at Geneva to show that our program is clearly not an all-out
effort. It is a "very long-range" program, he said, and on a moderate scale. He gave
assurances that the work is not of such magnitude as to jeopardize the future of the
strong program under way to achieve cheap fission power...
It is clear that policy issues are buried here, perhaps issues of the greatest sig-
nificance. It is equally clear that democratic public control is virtually impossible.
The statements and allusions made thus far are extremely vague and uninformative.
Chairman Strauss indicated certain policy decisions which had been made-e.g.,
that a program should be carried on, and that it should be only a small, long-range
effort-but he gave outsiders no basis whatsoever for evaluating these decisions. No
facts have been released on which an opinion can be built. It may be that such
strict concealment is necessary, although former Commissioner Smyth has advocated
outright lifting of the veil of secrecy in the thermonuclear field."9 In any case,
democratic control under these conditions is severely handicapped.
" Walker, Thermonuclear Reactions: Can They Be Used for Man's Benefit?, 33 FOREIGN AVAIRs 6o5
(1955).
"' Address of Senator Clinton P. Anderson before the Summer Conference of the Advertising Execu-
tives' Association, Inc., Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Release, July x2, 1955.
"See N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1955, p. 6, col. 3. On August 25, 1955, Senator Anderson further
suggested that the President himself issue "a public directive which would mobilize our scientific and
industrial power behind an effort to achieve controlled thermonuclear reactions." Revealing that ap-
proximately $33,000,000 was being spent in the controlled hydrogen field, the Senator also suggested
that "we immediately step up the rate and scale of our spending on controlled hydrogen energy." The
Businessman's Atom, address of Senator Clinton P. Anderson before the Cleveland Rotary Club, Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy Release, Aug. 25, 1955.
"
5 Press Conference, United States Delegation, International Conference for the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy, Geneva, Switzerland, Aug. 11, 1955. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1955, p. I, col. I.
A few more details were revealed in a subsequent press conference by Mr. Strauss. See N.Y. Times,
Oct. 4, 1955, p. s, col. i. Entitled "Project Sherwood," the program was described in terms of the
places and directors involved. The amount of money being spent was stated merely as "significant."
" See speech before the National Industrial Conference Board, Oct. 28, 1955, excerpted in 2 ATOMIC
INDusTrsL FoRum MEMO 5 (Nov. 1955).
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Tm STATE OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROLS
Atomic power presents the usual spate of issues for public policy. These bring
into account the many objectives which American Government must simultaneously
pursue. Decisions are required which necessarily make compromises between con-
flicting ends. Thus, specifically, if we take the road to maximum military use of
atomic power, we may not be in a good position in the international rivalry of
propaganda; but if we take the road of maximum civilian power, the military
program could suffer from lack of technicians. If we subsidize private enterprise
too greatly, industry will not have the incentive to develop competitive economic
power; but if we fail to subsidize enough, our development may lag. If we keep
down the government share by favoring those firms which can pay a larger share
of the developmental expenses, we run the risk of allowing a few companies to fill
the field; but if we insist upon equal access, we must hold back progress toward
practical power. If we permit free development, we may suffer from the exacerbated
hardships of technological change; but if we plan to soften the latter, we may slow
the rate of economic progress. If we favor public power, we weaken private in-
centive; but if we favor private power, we lose the strength of the existing price
yardstick.
American democracy prides itself on automatic balance-wheels and adjusters
which prevent the adoption of extreme policies. The watchdog Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, the General Advisory Committee, and the Military Liaison Com-
mittee are such in the governmental structure itself. But an active interplay of in-
fluences involving persons and groups outside the Government is also essential for
the best operation of these balance-wheels.
Hence, the proliferation of interests centering about the field of atomic power
is healthy for American democratic control. Fortunately, the contending forces are
so strong and the vested interests so large that no comprehensive settlement of
"policy" in favor of one group or another can take place. And this is as it should
be in a vital democratic society.
